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Interstate Groundwater Resources: The Federal Role 
John D. Leshy* 
Introduction - An Overview of the Groundwater Resource 
Extraction of groundwater has grown enormously in the last several 
decades, most dramatically in the years following World War II, after rural 
electrification and the invention of the high-speed centrifugal pump allowed 
pumping on a massive scale.  In 1950 about 38 million acre-feet ("MAF") of 
groundwater was extracted; by 1980 the amount had risen to 93 MAF. 
Extractions declined somewhat to about 86 MAF in 1995, but then increased 
to a new high of 93.4 MAF in 2000, probably influenced by regional droughts 
in the late 1990s.1  That volume of water is nearly enough to cover the entire 
land surface of the state of California one foot deep. 
* Harry Sunderland Distinguished Professor of Law, U.C. Hastings College of
the Law.  This paper grew out of remarks delivered at the ABA’s Environment, Energy 
and Resources Section’s 26th annual water law conference in San Diego in February 
2008.  It draws from and builds upon my earlier article, The Federal Role in Managing the 
Nation’s Groundwater, 11 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2004, and the 
groundwater, interstate/international, and federal law chapters I prepared for Joseph 
L. SAX, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF
WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS, Ch. 5, 8, 9, pp. 393-520, 799-1008 (4th ed.
2006).  I was the beneficiary of able research assistance in the fall of 2007 by Michael
Sugar, a student at Harvard Law School, and in the spring of 2008 by Laurie
Mikkelsen, a student at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
Groundwater seems to be spelled as one word or two words (with or without hyphen)
with about equal frequency. Because I believe, as the engineer’s joke goes, “ground
water” is what you get when you put ice in a blender, I use a single word unless a
quotation uses the two-word formulation.
1. SUSAN S. HUTSON, NANCY L. BARBER, JOAN F. KENNY, KRISTIN S. LINSEY, DEBORAH
S. LUMIA, & MOLLY A. MAUPIN, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2000 1
(U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1268, 2004), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/
circ/2004/circ1268/pdf/circular1268.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).  Data collection for
the next report, on water use in 2005, is in progress.
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About half the U.S. population uses groundwater for drinking.2  Nearly 
half of all water used in irrigated agriculture is groundwater, accounting for 
more than two-thirds of the total volume of groundwater extracted in 2000.3  
While water and oil are two natural resources vital to our way of life, the 
annual volume of groundwater extracted in the U.S. is more than one 
hundred times greater than the volume of oil Americans consume.4 
Besides the availability of relatively cheap electricity and powerful 
pumps, the reasons for growing dependence on groundwater are not hard to 
find.  From a utilitarian perspective, groundwater has a number of 
advantages over surface water.  There's much more of it.  Of all unfrozen 
freshwater found in the Earth's "hydrosphere" (all water and water vapor 
occurring beneath, on, or above the Earth's surface), about 95 percent is 
groundwater.5  It is widely found in both the humid East and the arid West. 
Because it is often available at or near its place of use, groundwater may be 
more efficient to use than surface water, needing fewer surface storage and 
conveyance facilities.  There are no evaporation losses as with surface 
2. Id. at 16-19.  Nearly all the people in the U.S. not serviced by a public water
provider (about 15% of the total population) obtain their water from groundwater 
withdrawals.  Public water providers now derive well over one-third of their supplies 
from groundwater.  In the western states, 96 percent of Idaho residents and 90 
percent of Montana residents depend on groundwater for domestic needs.  See Gone 
to the Well Once Too Often: The Importance of Ground Water to Rivers in the West, TROUT
UNLIMITED’S WESTERN WATER PROJECT, February 2007, at 5, available at http://www.tu.org/ 
atf/cf/%7B0D18ECB7-7347-445B-A38E-65B282BBBD8A%7D/groundwater_web.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
3. HUTSON, ET AL., supra note 2, at 4, 39, 40.  Not surprisingly, greater volumes of
groundwater tend to be used in the West.  California accounts for nearly one-fifth of 
the national total, followed by Texas, Nebraska, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, 
and Arizona.  More than two-thirds the total national volume of groundwater 
withdrawal is in these eight states.  Id. at tbls. 2, 4.  Irrigation uses 90 percent of 
Colorado’s total withdrawal of groundwater and 79 percent of Arizona’s.  See Gone to 
the Well Once Too Often, supra note 3, at 4. 
4. In 2004 the United States consumed somewhat more than 20 million barrels
of oil per day, or about 7.3 billion barrels over the year.  At 42 gallons per barrel, that 
is approximately 307 billion gallons, or about 940,000 acre-feet of oil, compared to 
about 93 million acre-feet of groundwater extracted annually in the United States. 
5. RALPH HEATH, BASIC GROUND–WATER HYDROLOGY 1 (U.S. Geological Survey
Water–Supply Paper No. 2220, 1998).  For example, California has about 425 million 
acre-feet of available groundwater, while all of its surface water reservoirs combined 
can store only about one-tenth that amount. Lester Snow & Anthony Saracino, The 
CALFED Ground Water Program, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST BIENNIAL GROUND WATER 
CONFERENCE 5 (Water Resources Center Report No. 95, 1998).  Groundwater 
accounted for about 40 percent of the total water withdrawals in California in 2000. 
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reservoirs,6 and techniques for deliberately recharging aquifers for extraction 
later have advanced measurably in recent years. Groundwater is less reliant 
than surface flows upon precipitation, with its seasonal and annual 
variations, and thus is more dependable. 
There are some offsetting disadvantages.  First, there is the cost of 
drilling wells and of electricity to drive pumps.  Water is, after all, quite 
heavy: about 240 gallons weighs a short ton; an acre-foot, about 1,359 short 
tons.  In some areas, retrievable groundwater is so far below the surface that 
it is not cost-effective to pay for the pump "lift" to the surface.7  Second, 
some aquifers are "recharged," or replenished, very slowly or not at all, and 
artificial recharge may not be possible.  Pumping water from these aquifers 
may amount to mining a non-renewable resource, much as petroleum or 
gold is mined.  Third, much groundwater is connected hydrologically to 
surface waters; in fact, the U.S. Geological Survey now estimates that 
groundwater is the source of almost 40 percent of the streamflow in the 
entire country.8  As groundwater extraction increases, surface streams may 
dwindle or disappear, and rights to use water from those streams may go 
unsatisfied, even though typically they were established first.  Fourth, some 
groundwater is of poor quality, and generally speaking, the deeper one goes 
the poorer the quality, because as the temperature increases with depth, the 
more chemicals dissolve out of the surrounding rock into the water.  Fifth, in 
some situations groundwater withdrawals may cause the surface of the 
earth to subside, which can damage or destroy surface structures such as 
homes or highways.9 
With such heavy use, it is not surprising that many areas of the United 
States are experiencing ground-water depletion,10 problems and 
6. Lake Mead, with its large surface area in the hot desert southwest,
evaporates around one million acre-feet of water (5 to 7 feet off the surface) every 
year.  That's more than three times what the city of Phoenix, serving well over one 
million people, uses in the same time period. 
7. Pumping water consumes an enormous amount of electricity.  See RONNIE
COHEN, BARRY NELSON & GARY WOLFF, ENERGY DOWN THE DRAIN 4 (Natural Resources 
Defense Council and Pacific Institute, 2004), available at http://www.nrdc.org/ 
water/conservation/edrain/edrain.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
8. DAVID W. MOODY, JERRY CARR, EDITH B. CHASE & RICHARD W. PAULSON, NATIONAL
WATER SUMMARY, 1986 3 (U.S.G.S., Water Survey Paper 2325, 1988). 
9. While other processes can cause subsidence, more than 80 percent of the
subsidence in the U.S. is believed to be related to groundwater withdrawals.  D.L. 
GALLOWAY, ET AL., LAND SUBSIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 107 (U.S.G.S. Circular # 1182, 1999). 
10. GROUND-WATER DEPLETION ACROSS THE NATION 1 (U.S. Geological Survey Fact
Sheet 1203-03, November 2003). 
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controversy.11  Nevertheless, groundwater will likely become ever more 
important.  This is especially true if, as seems increasingly likely, we are 
seeing the end of decades of relatively stable and favorable climatic 
conditions in most of the country — not to mention the possible impacts of 
greenhouse gas accumulations.  
Groundwater and Surface Water 
For a long time it has been known that groundwater can have relatively 
direct connections to surface water,12 but its contributions to stream flow, 
wetlands and surface vegetation are "masked and . . . impossible to observe 
directly."13  Detailed information about the connections has long been 
lacking, as has been the desire to obtain it.  Until groundwater began to be 
extracted in large quantities, there were relatively few situations in which the 
extraction was significant enough to threaten surface springs and streams. 
As a result, little effort was made to understand the nature of these 
connections sufficient to allow groundwater and surface water to be 
managed in a genuinely integrated fashion.  In short, it was both easy and in 
some sense necessary to turn a blind eye to whatever connections existed. 
That is plainly no longer the case.  Indeed, the National Water 
Commission 35 years ago called the need to integrate the management of 
surface water and groundwater one of the three principal problems in 
groundwater law, management and administration.14  The complex 
interrelationship poses regulatory challenges of the first magnitude, with 
which many jurisdictions are now grappling.15 
11. Professor Robert Glennon has documented some of these in WATER FOLLIES
(Island Press, 2002); see also Gone to the Well Once Too Often, supra note 3, at 8.  An 
emerging problem with interstate dimensions is the pumping of groundwater to 
facilitate the extraction of methane from coal beds in Wyoming and some other parts 
of the west.  See, e.g., Gone to the Well Once Too Often, supra note 3, at 6-16. 
12. Early 20th century water law treatise writers like Samuel Wiel were quite
aware of it.  His article, Need for Unified Law for Surface and Underground Water, 2 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 358, 369 (1929), presciently warned that the law “cannot prosper” in “ignorance 
or disregard” of the connection between ground and surface water. See also John 
Leshy & James Belanger, Arizona Law Where Ground and Surface Water Meet, 20 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 657, 658–59, 682–84 (1988).
13. Marcus Moench, Groundwater: The Challenge of Monitoring and Management, THE 
WORLD’S WATER 2004-2005, BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 79, 79 (Pacific 
Institute, 2005). 
14. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 232 (1973).  The
others were groundwater mining and quality problems. 
15. See, e.g., Gone to the Well Once Too Often, supra note 3, at 8-13.
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While groundwater is linked to surface water in many situations, it 
behaves differently from surface water.  Confined to pore spaces in geo-
logical beds, groundwater tends to move much more slowly than surface 
water.  As a result, the impact of withdrawals from a well on other wells in 
the vicinity, or on the flows of watercourses on the surface, may not be 
perceived for months, years, or even decades.16  Also, groundwater aquifers 
may recharge (replenish themselves) at widely differing rates.  Some may 
consist mostly of water deposited over geological time (what some call 
"fossil" water) and be exhaustible much as oil and gas deposits are. 
Sometimes a number of different aquifers may be found in different 
subsurface layers, connected to each other in complex ways, affecting both 
flow and recharge. 
As a National Research Council report put it, "ground water systems 
are difficult to observe and describe, not only because they are hidden from 
view, but also because they are three-dimensional and often very 
heterogeneous."17  In fact, the more that is learned about subsurface 
hydrology, the more complex it may become.  The scientific discipline that 
studies it, known as hydrogeology, increasingly relies on computer 
modeling.  Indeed, groundwater modeling is practically an essential tool to 
manage groundwater intelligently.  Unfortunately, in general, much less is 
known about groundwater — both its uses and its in situ characteristics —
than surface water.  A number of jurisdictions have never required all 
groundwater wells to be registered or their withdrawals measured and 
reported.18  Such information deficiencies necessarily make models less 
accurate. 
16. See, e.g., HEATH, supra note 6, at 14 (comparing the rate of movement of
groundwater to “the movement of water in the middle of a very large lake being 
drained by a very small stream”).  Groundwater velocity commonly ranges from one 
meter per day to one meter per year.  W. KENNETH HAMBLIN & ERIC H. CHRISTIANSEN,
EARTH’S DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 325 (9th ed. 2001). 
17. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GROUND WATER MODELS: SCIENTIFIC AND
REGULATORY APPLICATIONS 219 (1990).  Moench, supra note 14, at 80, observes that 
assessing aquifer pumping and recharge capacity requires “quantitative estimates of 
deep groundwater inflow from other aquifers, groundwater discharge to streams, 
evapotranspiration by plants and a wide variety of other factors . . . [which] often vary 
from year to year.” 
18. Many states have, finally, adopted well registration laws in recent decades,
but some do not require periodic reporting on withdrawals.  Equally important, most 
jurisdictions with well registration requirements exempt wells considered “small” 
and not worth the time and trouble (including hostility from the well-owners) to 
gather information about, much less regulate.  But many states exempt wells that 
have a much higher capacity than simply serving an average family; e.g., Missouri 
exempts wells pumping less than 100,000 gallons per day.  If pumped continuously, 
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Groundwater and the Law 
Generally speaking, allocation of rights to both groundwater and 
surface water is governed primarily by state law.  The legal doctrines states 
apply to groundwater tend to be much more variegated than those they 
apply to surface water.  That is, states tend to follow one of two basic legal 
regimes (riparian or prior appropriation) for surface water.  But five different 
groundwater legal doctrines command some support across the 50 states: 
capture, American reasonable use, correlative rights, the Restatement rule, 
and prior appropriation.  Moreover, especially in recent years, statutes have 
altered common law doctrines, either statewide or in smaller geographic 
units.  Increasingly, states are giving special governmental districts 
jurisdiction to manage groundwater in particular geographic areas according 
to principles somewhat at variance with conventional legal doctrines.  Also, 
the groundwater law doctrines in many states are, compared to their surface 
water laws, underdeveloped, with some basic questions about the nature of 
rights to pump groundwater unresolved. 
Moreover, states also vary widely in whether and how they account for 
hydrological connections between groundwater and surface water.  As a 
long-time Colorado water lawyer once put it, the law in many jurisdictions 
tried to create a "hydrologic bicycle" out of the hydrologic cycle,19 assigning 
water rights to groundwater and surface water separately without taking 
adequate account of the fact that the water involved is often part of a single, 
hydrologically integrated source. 
Federal law adds to these complexities.  The federal common law of 
water rights developed under the principles of Winters v. United States20 has 
some application to groundwater as well as surface water, even though the 
Supreme Court once sidestepped the opportunity to clarify whether Winters 
rights extend to groundwater.21  But some basic questions about how this 
doctrine applies to groundwater and hydrologically related surface water are 
not yet resolved.  Federal environmental laws like the Clean Water Act and 
the Endangered Species Act also can, in particular circumstances, have a 
such a well would yield 100 acre-feet per year, enough to serve well over 100 families 
at average rates of domestic consumption. See SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at p. 408-09; 
see also Gone to the Well Once Too Often, supra note 3, at 14-15. 
19. Raphael Moses, Basic Groundwater Problems, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 501,
503 (1968). 
20. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
21. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1976).  Most lower courts have
held that the doctrine does apply to groundwater, and none of the case law or 
commentary has so far unearthed any persuasive reason for a different result.  See 
SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at 971. 
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good deal to say about how groundwater, particularly that hydrologically 
related to surface water, is managed. 
Groundwater and State Lines 
Like surface water and many other natural resources, groundwater 
aquifers do not respect state lines.  There are indications that, the more we 
learn about groundwater, the more we learn it is connected to surface 
watercourses, which themselves often cross state lines.22  Pumping from a 
deep aquifer in southwestern Wyoming or northwestern New Mexico might 
affect the flow of the Colorado River all the way down to Mexico, for 
example.  Moreover, it seems the more we learn about the subsurface, the 
more likely we may find that seemingly isolated local aquifers connect to 
other aquifers that have connections across state lines through groundwater 
or surface water. All this means that groundwater likely has a more common 
interstate character than might first be appreciated.23 
Interstate groundwater issues have come to public attention in several 
areas of the country.  The poster child of groundwater use is the Ogallala 
22. See, e.g., Alan H. Welch, et al., Water Resources of the Basin and Range Carbonate-
Rock Aquifer System, White Pine County, Nevada, and Adjacent Areas in Nevada and Utah 
(U.S.G.S. Open-File Report 2007-5261) (available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2007/5261); 
James E. Deacon, et al., Fueling Population Growth in Las Vegas: How Large-Scale 
Groundwater Withdrawal Could Burn Regional Biodiversity, 57 BIOSCIENCE 688, 688 (Sept. 
2007) (interconnected aquifers in the Great Basin extend from near Salt Lake City, 
Utah, to Death Valley, CA). 
23. A useful overview of the Nation’s aquifers, showing the extent to which
they disrespect political boundaries, can be found at http://nationalatlas. 
gov/natlas/Natlasstart.asp.  See also Gone to the Well Once Too Often, supra note 3, at 9. 
An early survey of problems with interstate  groundwater aquifers is found in Morton 
W. Bittinger and E. Bruce Jones, Interstate and International Aquifers, 8 WATER RES. BULL.
NO. 2 386 (April 1972).  Transboundary groundwater resources have been subdivided
into four categories: (1) an isolated aquifer not linked to other aquifers or surface
water which is bisected by a state boundary; (2) an aquifer lying wholly within the
territory of one state but hydraulically linked to a river that crosses a state boundary;
(3) an aquifer lying wholly within the territory of one state but hydrologically linked
to an aquifer in a neighboring state; and (4) an aquifer situated entirely within the
territory of one state but with its recharge zone in another state.  JULIO A. BARBERIS,
INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER RESOURCES LAW, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, FAO LEGISLATIVE STUDY NO. 40, ROME, ITALY (1986).  Barberis was
speaking of international boundaries but the categorization is equally applicable to
state boundaries within the United States. Others find six or more categories. See
Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground
Water Resources and International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 201, 235-48 (2003).
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Aquifer, a gigantic aquifer that underlies large portions of Kansas and 
Nebraska, and smaller portions of Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Texas and Wyoming.  The largest in North America, it holds enough 
water to fill Lake Huron, is tapped by nearly 200,000 wells pumping 18 
million acre-feet a year to irrigate fourteen million acres (about 20 percent of 
all the irrigated land in the U.S.), and supplies drinking water to about four-
fifths of the people living over it.  With little natural recharge — if drained it 
would, because of sparse precipitation and an impervious geological layer 
between much of it and the surface, take 6,000 years to refill — the Ogallala 
has been mined for the past half-century. In some overlying areas the depth to 
water has increased so much that pump lifts have reached economic limits.24 
Other areas where interstate groundwater issues have emerged include 
the Sparta aquifer underlying parts of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and 
Tennessee,25 the sandstone aquifer underlying the Chicago area and eastern 
Wisconsin; and the Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer under several 
hundred square miles of northern Idaho and eastern Washington, which is 
the sole source of drinking water for most of the 400,000 people who live in 
the area. 
Interstate Watercourses and the Law 
There is a substantial body of federal law on interstate watercourses.26  
In a nutshell, federal law provides three ways to effectively apportion or 
otherwise address conflicts involving them between or among the states. 
First, the states can, with the consent of Congress, address such matters by 
interstate compact.27  Second, the Supreme Court can address them by 
applying the "equitable apportionment" doctrine of federal common law.28  
Both these mechanisms directly involve the states as sovereign entities; that 
24. See, e.g., Robert R.M. Verchick, Dust Bowl Blues: Saving and Sharing the Ogallala
Aquifer, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 13, 20 (1999). 
25. The State of Mississippi has sued the city of Memphis alleging the latter is
pumping excessively from the interstate aquifer to Mississippi’s detriment; the 
district court’s dismissal of the case is currently under review in the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, Tenn. 2008 WL 346102 (N.D. 
Miss. Feb. 6, 2008). 
26. See SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at 835-91.
27. A few dozen interstate compacts dealing with water have been entered in
force.  See Douglas Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts Between States, in 4 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 46.01 (Robert Beck ed., 2004). 
28. On compacts and equitable apportionment decrees, see SAX, ET AL., supra
note 1, at 842-78. 
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is, private water users cannot achieve compacts or litigate on behalf of 
states in the Supreme Court.29 
Third, Congress can unilaterally address such matters by ordinary 
legislation.  It can do this both directly (by legislation apportioning or 
otherwise aimed at particular interstate watercourses30), and indirectly, by 
enacting federal regulatory legislation that effectively supersedes existing 
interstate compacts, equitable apportionment decrees, or other 
arrangements. This latter practice is not well appreciated, but it rests mostly 
on the notion that a compact is federal law of the same general stature as 
other federal laws, and a particular Congress (such as one approving an 
interstate compact) cannot bind a future Congress.31  Thus, enactment of the 
federal Clean Water Act probably superseded substantive provisions of 
several interstate compacts providing for pollution control of individual 
streams.32  The Endangered Species Act almost certainly has the same 
effect.33 And because equitable apportionment decrees are expressions of 
federal common law,34 they too can be modified or overridden by Congress. 
Other means of resolving interstate disputes have been used, but they 
may not provide binding permanent solutions.  For example, the federal 
courts have on rare occasions been called upon to resolve water disputes 
among private parties claiming conflicting rights to an interstate 
watercourse.35  In such cases the courts have generally borrowed state water 
29. Id. at 873.
30. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565-66 (1963).
31. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“one legislature
cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature”); United States Trust Co. v. New 
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 45 (1977) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (One of the “fundamental premises 
of our popular democracy is that each generation of representatives can and will 
remain responsive to the needs and desires of those whom they represent . . . [and 
thus] new legislators will not automatically be bound by the policies and undertakings 
of earlier days.”). 
32. See Jerome C. Muys, George William Sherk, Marilyn C. O’Leary, The Utton
Transboundary Resources Center Model Interstate Water Compact, 47 NAT. RES. J. 17, 109-15, 
esp. at 11, n.130 (2007); see also GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE 
RESOLUTION OF INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES 49-58 (2000). 
33. Muys, et al., supra note 33, at 112; Riverside Irr. Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp.
583, 590 (D. Colo. 1983), aff’d on other grounds, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985). 
34. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907).
35. SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at 874-78.  Some of these lawsuits have involved a
state as well as private parties, and some of the litigation has led to equitable 
apportionment suits between states in the U.S. Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1983). 
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law doctrines and applied them as federal common law.36  Also, states may 
enter into agreements with each other regarding interstate watercourses 
without any federal involvement, but such arrangements have limited effect 
without some imprimatur of federal law.37 
In short, effective management of interstate water resources over the 
long term almost surely needs a dose of federal law. 
Interstate Groundwater and the Law 
The mechanisms and legal principles discussed in the previous section 
have been developed and fleshed out almost entirely in the context of 
surface water.  There is not much room to doubt, however, that they can and 
will likely be applied to groundwater where it has interstate dimensions.38 
36. See, e.g., Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485 (1911).  This solution was readily
available because the pertinent states seem to have applied the same general 
principles of water law.  For a discussion of what might happen when the pertinent 
states apply different water law doctrines, see Douglas Grant, Private Interstate Suits, § 
44.05(b), in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (Robert Beck ed. 2001) (noting the decided 
cases “offer only limited guidance” on the subject).  See also Ward H. Fischer, 
Management of Interstate Ground Water, 7 NAT. RES. L. 521, 525-28 (1974). 
37. It is also relevant here that the “dormant” aspect of the interstate
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution has been applied by the Supreme Court to 
sharply limit the ability of a state to prevent water extracted within its borders from 
being sent out of state, unless Congress approves.  Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 
960 (1982).  There has been some lively scholarly debate about the relationship 
between the dormant commerce clause and the equitable apportionment doctrine, 
with most arguing that the latter is a better method of handling interstate 
groundwater conflicts.  See, e.g., Albert E. Utton, Sporhase, El Paso, and the Unilateral 
Allocation of Water Resources: Some Reflections on International and Interstate Groundwater Law, 
57 U. COLO. L. REV. 549 (1986). 
38. More broadly, the federal government has ample constitutional authority
to regulate or otherwise influence groundwater management and use regardless of 
whether the resource has an interstate character. The Supreme Court said in Sporhase 
v. Nebraska that the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause gives Congress “affirmative
power . . . to implement its own policies concerning [groundwater] regulation. . . .
Ground water overdraft is a national problem and Congress has the power to deal
with it on that scale.”  458 U.S. 941, 953-54 (1982) (dictum).  While the case
concerned pumping from the multi-state Ogallala aquifer, the Court noted its
interstate character only to “confirm” the substantial federal interest in groundwater.
The Court bottomed that federal interest on the fact that most water, including
groundwater, is used for agriculture which operates in a worldwide market and
provides what the Court called the “archtypical example of commerce among the
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Past Federal Actions Regarding Interstate Groundwater 
The federal government has long been relatively quiescent about 
groundwater, whether of interstate dimensions or not.  There is one small 
but important exception: The groundwater resources program of the United 
States Geological Survey (USGS) attempts to systematically gather 
nationwide data about groundwater withdrawals and aquifer characteristics. 
The amount of money devoted to this important task — less than $10 
million per year — is trifling, given the magnitude and importance of the 
resource.39 
Apart from data-gathering, federal actions vis-à-vis interstate 
groundwater have had a hodgepodge character.  Despite the notoriety of 
declining water levels in the Ogallala Aquifer, for example, Congress's 
response has been minimal.  In 1983, it authorized a High Plains States 
Groundwater Demonstration Program, directing the Interior Department's 
Bureau of Reclamation to look into ways to recharge the aquifer.40  Prodded 
by a federal court decision, the Internal Revenue Service has allowed 
groundwater pumpers from the Ogallala, but not elsewhere, a cost depletion 
deduction.41 
Elsewhere, Congress in 1972 authorized the "Closed Basin" federal 
groundwater pumping project to help Colorado deal with a nearly one 
million acre-foot deficit it had run up under the 1939 Rio Grande Compact 
with Texas and New Mexico. This project pumps groundwater from the 
northern portion of the San Luis Valley, separated from the rest of the Valley 
by a low alluvial fan, and transports it south to discharge into the Rio 
Grande River.42 
several States for which the Framers of our Constitution intended to authorize 
federal regulation.”  Id. at 953. 
39. USGS’s total budget for gathering and analyzing information about water
commands something less than $100 million of federal tax revenues; state and local 
governments contribute matching funds to bring the total sum expended on the 
enterprise to something more than $200 million per year.  See GROUND-WATER
DEPLETION ACROSS THE NATION, supra note 11. 
40. High Plains States Groundwater Demonstration Program, 43 U.S.C. 390g
(2008).  The title is a bit of a misnomer.  Reflecting various cross-currents in water 
politics, the legislation also authorized demonstration groundwater recharge 
projects in other reclamation states outside the High Plains, and prohibited using 
any program funds for recharge projects that would “utilize water originating in the 
drainage basin of the Great Lakes.” 
41. SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at 488-89.
42. Pub. L. No. 92-514, 86 Stat. 964 (1972).  Although not directly applicable to
interstate groundwater, Congress two years ago directed the Interior Department to 
establish a joint “Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Program” with Mexico to 
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To date, the most interesting piece of federal legislation dealing with 
interstate groundwater is found in the rather innocuously named Lincoln 
County Conservation, Recreation and Development Act of 2004.  It is 
discussed in more detail further below.43 
Other Federal Actions Regarding Interstate Groundwater 
Only a handful of interstate compacts refer expressly to groundwater.44  
Litigation in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in recent years 
has, however, effectively extended compacts that are silent on the subject to 
include groundwater hydrologically related to the surface water addressed in 
the compact.45  Similarly, although the Supreme Court has not yet been 
asked to apportion any interstate aquifers, groundwater hydrologically 
provide the informational basis for addressing serious groundwater and related 
surface water problems along the border. Pub.L. 109-448, 120 Stat. 3328 (2006).  The 
Bush Administration’s proposed FY 2009 budget would delete funding for this program. 
43. Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation and Development Act of 2004,
Pub.L. No. 108-424, 118 Stat. 2403 (2004). 
44. See Douglas Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts Between States, in 4 WATERS 
AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.03 (Robert Beck ed., 2004). 
45. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995); 533 U.S. 1 (2001); 543 U.S. 86 (2004)
(Arkansas River Compact of 1949; Supreme Court approved an award of damages to 
Kansas for Colorado’s post-Compact increases in groundwater pumping); Kansas v. 
Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (2003) (Republican River Compact of 1943; Kansas’s claim that 
upstream Nebraska was stealing Kansas’s entitlement by pumping groundwater was 
settled by, among other things, putting a moratorium on new wells in certain 
locations in Nebraska).  See also Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 341 (1964) (decree in 
statutory apportionment case specified, without elaboration, that it applies to “water 
drawn from the mainstream [of the Colorado river] by underground pumping”).  In 
February 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the invitation of the Solicitor 
General to take up a dispute between Montana and Wyoming which, among other 
things, raises the question about whether and how groundwater pumping should be 
accounted for under the Yellowstone River Compact of 1950.  Montana v. Wyoming, 127 
S. Ct. 2294 (May 14, 2007).  One of Montana’s complaints is that pumping in
Wyoming to extract coalbed methane in tributary basins of the Yellowstone (the
Tongue and Powder Rivers) has depleted surface water flows.  The developers of a
recent model interstate water compact noted a “strong consensus” that groundwater
connected to surface flows should be expressly included in any compact, and
expressed the view that the Supreme Court is “highly likely to imply its inclusion
unless it is expressly excluded with precise language.”  See Muys, et al., supra note
33, at 28; see also id. at 71-73.  The compact and commentary may also be found at
http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/Model_Compact_NRJ_Final.pdf (last visited Mar.
30, 2008).
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connected to surface water is, as in compact litigation, beginning to be 
swept within the ambit of equitable apportionment decrees.46 
The Federal Role in Interstate Groundwater - Some Tools 
The national government has, as I have noted before, rarely taken the 
initiative to address groundwater problems across the country, whether or 
not they have interstate connections.47  Its relative torpor is explained by 
several factors, including a long (though hardly uniform48) deference to state 
water law and its lack of enthusiasm for building groundwater projects 
compared to conventional surface water projects. There is, however, room to 
doubt whether the national government can or should remain relatively 
passive in a climate-disturbed era.  Water supply and management systems 
are under increasing stress.  Reliance on groundwater is likely to grow as 
surface water supplies become more precarious. 
Groundwater that has an interstate dimension is a logical place for 
federal action because, as noted earlier, effective interstate management 
requires some imprimatur of federal law.  If the national government wanted 
to take a more assertive role here, there is no doubt about its authority to do 
so.49  It has many levers to exercise.  The following lists some steps it could 
46. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 14 (1995); 534 U.S. 40, 53 (2001)
(approving a settlement that constrained upstream Wyoming’s pumping of 
hydrologically connected groundwater, which the settlement defined as water 
pumped from a well “so located and constructed that if water were intentionally 
withdrawn continuously for forty years, the cumulative stream depletion would be 
greater than or equal to 28% of the total groundwater withdrawn by that well”).  In 
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936), the state of Washington sued its neighbor to 
adjudicate the waters of the Walla Walla River and alleged, among other things, 
Oregon residents were pumping groundwater to its detriment.  The Court rejected 
the claim, approving the finding of the Special Master that Washington offered “no 
satisfactory proof that the use of the water from these wells materially lessens the 
quantity of water available for use within the State of Washington.” 297 U.S. at 526. 
47. John D. Leshy, The Federal Role in Managing the Nation’s Groundwater, 11
HASTINGS W.-NW. J.ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2004).  An earlier treatment is Zachary A. 
Smith, Federal Intervention in the Management of Groundwater Resources: Past Efforts and Future 
Prospects, 15 PUBLIUS 145 (Winter, 1985). 
48. Reed Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority
Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241; Bruce A. Machmeier, Note: 
Federal Acquisition of Non-Reserved Rights after New Mexico, 31 STAN. L. REV. 885, 909 n. 20 
(1979) (citing 25 federal statutes not deferring to state water law). 
49. See generally supra note 38, which notes that federal authority over
groundwater is not dependent on the resource crossing state lines. 
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take, approximately in order of their political feasibility, with the most 
widely acceptable first. 
Current information gaps about groundwater — its occurrence and 
characteristics (including recharge rates, connections to surface water, and 
so forth) and even current extraction rates — are enormous.  As the U.S.G.S. 
has noted, although many aquifer systems are monitored within states, 
"coordinated water-level monitoring generally has not been done for 
aquifers that cross State boundaries (the High Plains aquifer is an 
exception)."50  Good information about groundwater would be very helpful in 
just about every possible effort to resolve interstate groundwater issues 
intelligently, whether by negotiation, litigation, congressional action, 
regulation, market-oriented transactions, or otherwise.  One would therefore 
hope to find general agreement that the U.S. should expand its important 
information-gathering role. The U.S.G.S. is widely respected and its 
credibility is invaluable in such a contentious area.  It seems short-sighted 
in the extreme that the U.S. currently spends only a few million dollars a 
year on gathering this information.51 
Beyond information gathering, the national government has a number 
of carrots and sticks at its disposal to promote resolution of interstate 
groundwater conflicts.  For one thing, it will likely be called upon to build or 
contribute funds to projects necessary to utilize or manage interstate 
groundwater resources.  In so doing it could implement the mostly ignored 
but still cogent recommendations of the National Water Commission to 
use federal water project planning and operations to promote more 
sensible management of groundwater by states,52 particularly to leverage 
them to work with other states to address groundwater management with 
interstate dimensions. 
The national government could also use its significant powers over the 
use of federal lands, which are a significant part of the land base of most 
western states, to promote intelligent management of interstate aquifers. 
Many, probably most, schemes to make greater use of aquifers with 
interstate dimensions will require approval to use federal lands for pumping 
facilities, pipelines, monitoring wells, and so forth.  The United States could 
condition use of its lands for such purposes on states reaching satisfactory 
50. U.S.G.S. Fact Sheet 1203-03, supra note 11, at 4.  Moench, supra note 14, at
92, notes that serious investments are “almost never” made to gather and analyze 
data to gauge sustained yield of individual aquifers “unless they already have 
evidence of problems.” 
51. Currently, for example, U.S.G.S. receives data from groundwater monitors
at only one site in the entire state of Utah, and only nine sites in Nevada. See 
http://waterdata.usgs.gov/nwis/current/?type=gw (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
52. See John D. Leshy, The Federal Role in Managing the Nation’s Groundwater, 11
HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 10-12 (2004). 
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agreements regarding aquifer management.  The U.S. can also use its 
leverage to see to it that such agreements protect any national interests 
involved, such as national security (e.g., the needs of military bases), the 
interests of Native Americans, and the environment (e.g., water quality, 
endangered species).  There is a long history of the U.S. using its power over 
federal lands to influence state water management.  Many decades ago, for 
example, its refusal to permit federal lands to be used to support non-
federal water projects in Wyoming and New Mexico spurred states to negotiate 
interstate compacts on several western rivers, including the Colorado.53 
The national government will also in many situations have federal-law-
based water rights that may be implicated in withdrawals from interstate 
aquifers.  Many federal reservations (e.g., national parks, monuments, 
wildlife refuges, conservation areas, and military bases) carry with them 
water rights that might require protection of hydrologically related 
groundwater.  This was illustrated by the Supreme Court's unanimous 
decision in Cappaert, where the assertion of federal water rights halted a 
groundwater-based irrigation project on private land some miles away, even 
though the project had water rights perfected under state law.54 
Some of the national government's regulatory programs also can 
directly affect the management of groundwater, including that with 
interstate dimensions.  The Endangered Species Act, for example, has been 
brought to bear to force states to better manage groundwater withdrawals. 
The saga of the Edwards Aquifer in Texas demonstrated the power of the Act 
to change a deeply embedded culture of non-management of a crucial aquifer, 
albeit one without interstate dimensions.55  The Clean Water Act and other 
regulatory schemes might also provide a mechanism for federal influence. 
Finally, Congress could use its legislative authority to apportion or 
otherwise control management of aquifers between or among states.  Of 
course, political factors (principally those growing out of the States' equal 
representation in the U.S. Senate) make this difficult, absent substantial 
agreement among the states involved. 
The availability of these tools does not mean they need to be 
exercised.  Local areas and states may take steps to address interstate 
groundwater problems without the direct assistance of the national 
53. See DANIEL TYLER, SILVER FOX OF THE ROCKIES: DELPHUS E. CARPENTER AND
WESTERN WATER COMPACTS 119, 154, 169, 314 n. 58 (2003); William A. Paddock, The Rio 
Grande Compact of 1938, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 13 (2001). 
54. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1976).  The Court did not
identify any interstate connection, but the aquifer involved may well have interstate 
dimensions.  See sources cited supra note 23. 
55. See, e.g., Todd H. Votteler, Raiders of the Lost Aquifer? Or, the Beginning of the End
of Fifty Years of Conflict Over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 15 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 257 (2002). 
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government, even though they are not enforceable as federal law without the 
blessing of the United States.56 
The Lincoln County, Nevada Legislation - A Harbinger for the Future? 
Congress recently provided a useful example of how it might exercise 
the tools at its disposal.  In 2004, as part of a package dealing with a variety 
of public land management issues in eastern Nevada, Congress addressed a 
proposal by the Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) to pump, and 
send south to the burgeoning metropolitan Las Vegas area, groundwater 
from several basin-and-range valleys in northeastern Nevada.  The aquifer 
complex proposed to be tapped extends into Utah.  Section 301 of the 
legislation promotes interstate cooperation in three significant ways. 
First, information gathering: The legislation calls on USGS and the 
states to gather and analyze information about interstate groundwater 
basins that might be affected by the SNWA's plans.57  The resulting report, 
released in December 2007, will likely have a great deal of influence over 
how that situation will be resolved.58 
Second, federal land use: The legislation gives the SNWA a perpetual 
right-of-way across federal lands for constructing and operating a water 
conveyance system to bring water from the north down to Las Vegas.59  But 
Congress attached the significant string that no groundwater from basins 
that cross state lines would be diverted for the project without an agreement 
from the two states involved.  Specifically, section 301(e)(3) provides that 
"[p]rior to any transbasin diversion from groundwater basins located within" 
both Nevada and Utah, the two states "shall reach an agreement regarding 
the division of water resources of those interstate ground-water flow 
system(s) from which water will be diverted and used by the [Southern 
Nevada] project."  The section also provides that the agreement "shall allow 
56. For an example where the federal government was not involved, see
INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT IN THE MATTER OF THE COORDINATED MANAGEMENT OF THE
PULLMAN-MOSCOW GROUND WATER AQUIFER (April 20, 1992), available at http://www. 
fao.org/docrep/008/y5739e/y5739e0b.htm#bm11..2.1.1 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
57. Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-424, § 301(e)(1), 118 Stat. 2403, 2413-14 (2004), requires an 
investigation of the “ground water quantity, quality, and flow characteristics” of 
aquifers in White Pine and Lincoln Counties, Nevada, “and adjacent areas in Utah,” 
to determine, among other things, “the approximate volume of water stored” in these 
aquifers, the “discharge and recharge characteristics “ and “hydrogeologic and other 
controls that govern the discharge and recharge” of each aquifer system. 
58. See sources cited supra note 23.
59. Lincoln County Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act of 2004, §
301(b)(2). 
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for the maximum sustainable beneficial use of the water resources and 
protect existing water rights." 
Third, federal financial and other assistance: The legislation pays for 
the information-gathering out of an account funded by the sale of federal 
lands in the Las Vegas area, and waives a requirement to pay fair market 
rental value for the right-of-way across federal lands.60 
In a nutshell, Congress furnished the SNWA with federal help for 
information gathering and analysis, federal funds, and federal lands for a 
right-of-way for project facilities, in return for which Nevada had to reach 
agreement with Utah on the management of the aquifer.  It means that, if 
Nevada and Utah cannot agree, the SNWA cannot tap the interstate 
resource.  Of course, Congress could simply repeal it, which would give the 
advantage to Nevada, and put Utah in the position of seeking judicial relief. 
Utah would, presumably, strenuously oppose this.  Or Congress could 
apportion the aquifer itself, or otherwise specify the conditions under which 
the SNWA proposal would go forward. 
Alternatively, either state could seek to invoke the Supreme Court's 
original jurisdiction to address the issue in equitable apportionment 
litigation.  It is not clear whether the Supreme Court would agree to hear the 
case, for the Court has sometimes demanded a showing that the applicant 
state is suffering a real injury of serious magnitude to exercise its 
"extraordinary power . . . to control the conduct of one state at the suit of 
another."61  Assuming such a showing could be made, the litigation might 
take many years to conclude.  Whether time is a serious issue is not clear. 
SNWA's project is to be implemented in phases, and it may argue that only 
a later phase will directly reach the interstate aquifer.62 
Although the Lincoln County legislation did not address it, the 
Nevada-Utah situation involves a fourth dimension noted above: the 
presence of federal-law-based (so-called Winters) water rights.  The Great 
Basin National Park and several other protected areas of federal land, each 
60. Id.  The Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1764(g),
does not provide for perpetual rights-of-ways, and requires that the holder of a right 
of way across federal land “shall pay in advance the fair market value thereof,” with 
some limitations. 
61. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921); see also SAX, ET AL., supra note
1, at 858-59, 871. 
62. In April 2007, the Nevada State Engineer approved SNWA’s application to
appropriate groundwater in a valley lying wholly within Nevada (whose connection to 
interstate waters is not completely clear) for export to Las Vegas in the first phase of 
the project.  SNWA had applied to pump and export 91,000 acre-feet a year, but the 
decision granted it the right to pump 40,000 acre-feet a year for 10 years, with 
monitoring, and signaled the possibility this could increase to 60,000 acre-feet if no 
harm was detected. 
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of which may have federal reserved water rights, are located in areas that 
might be affected by the SNWA's groundwater pumping and export plan.63  
When the SNWA applied to the Nevada State Engineer to appropriate 
groundwater in eastern Nevada to carry out its project, the federal 
government protested on the ground the appropriation could injure its 
Winters rights.  In September 2006, however, the United States agreed to 
dismiss its protest after the parties reached a detailed agreement which, to 
simplify somewhat, set up committees to monitor the project's impact on 
federal water rights and make appropriate changes if unreasonable harm to 
those rights would result.64 
How should interstate groundwater resources be managed, and rights 
to their use allocated among the interested states? 
The answer is not self-evident.  Sensible management of groundwater 
is different enough without considering state lines. The complex 
characteristics of aquifers, their connections to surface water, and the slow 
and somewhat uncertain movement of water within them all raise 
management challenges of the first order.  The presence of state lines simply 
adds to the difficulty by bringing new sovereign entities into the picture. 
There is, for example, the question of whether to take up these issues 
at all.  States have found that establishing and operating regulatory 
machinery for managing groundwater in order to protect surface streams can 
be complicated and costly, in political as well as fiscal terms.  This is a 
major reason why governments in many places have put off grappling with 
the challenge until a true crisis looms, such as irremediable contamination 
from saline intrusion.65  Should there be some sort of cost-benefit analysis 
63. See Deacon, et al., supra note 23, at 695; see also Rob Dubuc, Snake Valley to
Las Vegas: Keep Your Pipes Out of Our Aquifer! 27 J. LAND RESOURCES AND ENVTL. L. 151, 
181-87 (2007).  The 1986 legislation establishing Great Basin National Park
specifically disclaimed any new implied federal water rights, but the Park included
federal lands that had previously been set aside as a national forest and a national
monument, and the legislation creating the Park did retain any water rights that “may
have been associated with the initial establishment and withdrawal of Humboldt
National Forest and the Lehman Caves National Monument,” which were included in
the Park upon its creation. 16 U.S.C. § 410mm-1(h).
64. Stipulation for Withdrawal of Protests (before the Nevada State Engineer,
September 2006).   The Stipulation did allow the United States to produce and 
comment on certain reports, including a U.S.G.S. report, PEGGY E. ELLIOTT, DAVID A. 
BECK, AND DAVID E. PRUDIC, CHARACTERIZATION OF SURFACE-WATER RESOURCES IN THE GREAT
BASIN NATIONAL PARK AREA AND THEIR SUSCEPTIBILITY TO GROUND-WATER WITHDRAWALS IN
ADJACENT VALLEYS, WHITE PINE COUNTY, NEVADA (Scientific Investigations Report 2006-
5099). The stipulation has been criticized for lacking a "substantial amount of teeth."  
Dubuc, supra note 64, at 189-92. 
65. Id. at 506-07.
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applied to determine when the challenge has to be taken up in the context 
of interstate groundwater? Might it simply prove too costly to regulate 
groundwater in order to protect surface streams?66  Or does the interstate 
character suggest that these problems be addressed sooner rather than later? 
As noted earlier, federal law will, in the end, likely have a lot to say 
about how the interstate groundwater resource is managed.  While federal 
law does not have to follow state water law, those crafting federal 
arrangements will naturally consider borrowing state law, especially if the 
affected states agree on the legal principles to be applied.67  With 
groundwater, however, the affected states may not agree very often. 
Consider the Ogallala Aquifer: Texas still follows a capture rule (where 
priority is irrelevant), New Mexico and Colorado follow prior appropriation, 
and Nebraska follows correlative rights (where priority is sometimes 
relevant, sometimes not).68 
Even where the states involved apply the same groundwater doctrine, 
there may be important differences in the pertinent legal rules.  In the 
Nevada-Utah situation, for example, both states apply the prior 
appropriation doctrine to groundwater as well as surface water, but it is 
not clear whether they treat groundwater connected to surface water the 
same way.69 
To the extent an interstate aquifer is renewable, should it be managed 
on something like a sustainable basis?  If so, how should "sustainability" be 
defined?  Strictly, so that withdrawals cannot exceed recharge?  Or is some 
"mining" of the resource permissible?  If an interstate aquifer has a 
negligible recharge rate, should a no-mining policy be followed even if the 
effect is to lock up from use what might be a huge volume of water?  States 
have differing policies on such questions.70 
There is also the problem of delayed effect because of the rate at which 
groundwater moves laterally through an aquifer.  Pumping in one state may 
not affect wells in another state for years or decades.  Conversely, it may 
66. Indeed, one groundwater expert has been quoted making the “dark and
bold assertion” that nowhere on the planet has groundwater management genuinely 
succeeded.  See Burke W. Griggs, Does Groundwater Management Work? 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 391, 391 (2006) (referring to comments of Dr. Tushaar Shah). 
67. SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at 868-70.
68. Id. at 414-43.
69. See, e.g, GARY BRYNER AND ELIZABETH PURCELL, GROUNDWATER LAW SOURCEBOOK
39, 52 (Natural Resources Law Center (2003), available at http://www.colorado.edu/ 
Law/centers/nrlc/publications/Groundwater%20Law%20Sourcebook.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2008).  See also Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206, 1213 n. 6 
(Utah 2000); Gone to the Well Once Too Often, supra note 3, at 10. 
70. See, e.g.,  SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at 404-05 (“safe yield” is a slippery
concept); 478-90 (policies toward groundwater mining). 
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take a long time for improvements to be seen in one state if pumps in 
another state are shut down.  How should such effects be taken into 
account?  States may different policies on such matters. 
Similarly, how should connections between groundwater and surface 
water be accounted for, when either or both cross state lines?  It is easy —
too easy, perhaps — to say that where such a connection exists, 
groundwater and surface water ought to be managed as a common resource. 
It is hard to quarrel with the idea that the law governing the resource should 
recognize that reality. But hydrologic connections vary in strength, and here 
too effects may be delayed. Some groundwater withdrawals affect 
streamflows with some immediacy, but some may not affect flow for 
decades.  Judgment is necessary to decide to what extent hydrologically 
related groundwater ought to be managed with surface water.  Here too, 
states follow very different policies on the subject.71 
The legal questions that can be raised by interstate groundwater 
allocations and management bring to mind a fertile law school examination. 
For example, is it relevant how much each state contributes to the aquifer —
how much of the aquifer's total water volume is found under or recharged in 
each state?  In its 1984 decision in Colorado v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court 
made clear that the source of water is basically irrelevant to interstate 
equitable apportionment law.72  But that was a surface water case.  Would it 
reach the same result with respect to an aquifer?  Even an aquifer that is not 
hydrologically related to surface water; that is, is in a confined pool much 
like a petroleum deposit?  And even where a state claims it, and not private 
parties, who owns the groundwater?  The answer is not clear.73  Similarly, an 
aquifer may recharge at different rates in different places; e.g., recharge of 
the Ogallala in New Mexico may be faster or greater than in Texas. Ought 
that be relevant to how the Ogallala's waters are apportioned among the 
states, or otherwise managed? 
Should the quality and effectiveness of the respective states' 
regulatory programs for managing withdrawals from an interstate aquifer be 
71. Id. at 454-68.
72. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323 (1984).  The source of water is
relevant in resolving controversies to water bodies that cross national boundaries. 
The Helsinki Rules that restate the law of international watercourses provide that 
each nation is entitled to a “reasonable and equitable share” in the beneficial uses of 
the waters in an international water course, and defines “reasonable and equitable” 
to include, among many other factors, the “contribution of water by each basin 
State.”  See  SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at 891-92. 
73. Only two years before Colorado v. New Mexico, in a different context, Justice
Stevens credited Nebraska’s claim to public ownership of groundwater found in 
Nebraska as “logically more substantial than claims to public ownership of other 
natural resources.”  Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956-57 (1982). 
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relevant to resolving interstate conflicts?  An affirmative answer might seem 
obvious, but the Supreme Court has sent some decidedly mixed signals on 
the matter. In Colorado v. New Mexico, the Court refused to penalize New 
Mexico for its lackadaisical management of the flows of the Vermejo River 
within its borders.  It rejected Colorado's claim that better management in 
New Mexico would have effectively freed up some of the River's water for 
Colorado's use under the equitable apportionment principles.74  On the 
other hand, the Court has said that states "have an affirmative duty under 
the doctrine of equitable apportionment to take reasonable steps to 
conserve and even to augment the natural resources within their borders 
for the benefit of other States."75  It has also spoken approvingly of 
effective state regulatory programs in disputes involving water moving 
across state lines.76 
How should adverse impacts on the environment, such as on species 
nurtured in waters supported or influenced by interstate aquifers, be 
weighed?  Here too the law that applies to surface watercourses with 
interstate dimensions is not completely settled.77  As noted earlier, however, 
federal laws like the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act may 
come into play. 
Turning to another set of issues mentioned earlier, how should federal 
water rights (arising from the Winters doctrine) be treated in addressing 
interstate groundwater issues? Unless expressly provided otherwise, it 
seems reasonable to expect that federal rights to interstate waterbodies that 
arise in a particular state should count against that state's apportionment. 
But this may not always be the case, particularly with respect to federal 
water rights for Indians.78  A more important question may be whether the 
United States will have the political will to vigorously assert and seek to 
protect federal water rights in the resolution of interstate groundwater 
disputes. A sobering object lesson here (though it involves international 
rather than interstate dimensions) is the San Pedro River in Arizona, a small 
stream with superlative wildlife and biodiversity values.  It is gravely 
threatened by groundwater pumping which is not effectively regulated under 
74. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
75. Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983) (the resource at stake was
salmon, not water, and the Court ultimately refused to intervene). 
76. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. at 956-57 (1982); cf. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515
U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (giving Wyoming an opportunity to prove, in an equitable 
apportionment case, that it was injured by the federal government’s failure to “police 
consumption” of water from federal reservoirs in the basin). 
77. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1995); SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at
868, and sources cited therein. 
78. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.06 (Nell Newton et al.
eds. 2005). 
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Arizona law.  Congress has recognized its environmental qualities by 
designating the river corridor as the Nation's first National Riparian 
Conservation Area, and investing it with an express federal reserved water 
right.  Enforcing the right to protect the streamflow has, however, been 
bogged down for two decades in Arizona's seemingly endless effort to 
adjudicate the water rights of the Gila River system, of which the San Pedro 
is a small tributary.  As a result the stream is drying up.79 
If an interstate apportionment is made that allows states to draw down 
an interstate aquifer to such an extent that surface streams, and water rights 
in those streams (whether based on federal or state law) are adversely 
affected, should those water right holders be compensated?  To the extent 
state law water rights are defeated by an interstate agreement, 
compensation is not required as a matter of law.  Interstate allocations of 
water are not, as a matter of law, constrained by the rights to use those 
waters that have been recognized under the laws of the individual states. 
This is because a state may use its own law to create rights only in things 
over which it has sovereign authority, as recognized by federal law.80  That is, 
state-law-based rights to use an interstate body of water cannot convey 
more water than the amount to which that state is entitled as a matter of 
federal law.  Thus, a federal statute or interstate compact could, for example, 
apportion an aquifer underlying Utah and Nevada in such a way as to defeat 
Utah-law-based rights to water in, or dependent upon, the aquifer, without 
providing compensation to those holders of state water rights. 
This is not to minimize the effort that holders of water rights under 
state law will make to avoid this result — exercising political influence over 
state positions in compact negotiations, equitable apportionment litigation, 
or in Congress.  But it is to say that state water rights-based arguments 
cannot legally limit how interstate water bodies are apportioned.  Further, if 
a policy decision is made to compensate them, who should pay?  And what 
if compensation is not a sufficient remedy?  What result, for example, if a 
species listed under the federal Endangered Species Act is dependent upon 
the surface water flows that will dwindle with groundwater pumping? 
79. SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at 465-66.  Cf. Dubuc, supra note 64, at 191-93
(arguing that federal reserved rights may be the best way to protect the interstate 
aquifer underlying the Nevada/Utah border from the SNWA export plan); see also High 
Country Citizens’ Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D.Colo. 2006) (federal agencies 
have judicially enforceable legal obligation to protect federal water rights in 
appropriate proceedings). 
80. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106-09
(1938);  SAX, ET AL., supra note 1, at 849-50. 
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Confronting the Unknown 
As the states, the federal government and other water interests begin 
to grapple with groundwater with interstate dimensions, it will often be the 
case that much will not be known about these aquifer systems and their 
connections to surface watercourses.  This creates a powerful impulse to 
adopt a kind of "wait-and-see" approach.  This is the position taken by 
Nevada and the United States in the stipulation that resulted in the 
dismissal of the U.S. protest of the SNWA's application to appropriate 
groundwater.  This "adaptive management" approach is becoming more 
common in managing natural resources.  While often necessary because of 
the difficulty of forecasting long-term impacts of actions taken today, it 
creates a tension between the perceived need for secure authority to 
proceed with a substantial investment to utilize the resource, and the 
uncertainty about what environmental impact will follow and how to address 
that impact once it can be gauged. 
Where groundwater extraction (in general, and perhaps especially 
where interstate groundwater extraction) is involved, if it turns out the 
impact is significant, by the time this fact becomes known, mitigating it may 
be difficult, if not impossible.  Suppose that, after the SNWA project is built 
and operates for several years, groundwater pumpers or surface water 
appropriators in Utah are unable to satisfy their rights.  Or suppose the 
wetlands in a federal protected area in Utah begins to dry up.  In each case 
the evidence points toward the SNWA project pumping as being 
responsible.  Then what?  The project will likely have already been sized and 
built in the expectation that large amounts of groundwater can be pumped. 
Development in the Las Vegas area will have presumably proceeded on this 
assumption.  Indeed, much groundwater may have already been pumped 
and delivered before the impact was understood.  Finally, if the pumps are shut 
off once the impact is discovered, the harm may continue for a considerable 
time, depending on the rate of groundwater movement and recharge. 
Possible outcomes at that point include (1) waiving or relinquishing 
the federal water rights, in effect sacrificing the Refuge's values; (2) 
providing compensation or mitigation, such as by acquiring or creating new 
wetlands or a new Refuge with benefits as equivalent as possible to those 
lost; or (3) using some of the pumped groundwater to keep the Refuge 
supplied with water, artificially.81 
81. The philosophical dimensions of sustaining “natural” landscapes by
artificial means were explored in BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989, 2006); see 
also Peter Kareiva, Sean Watts, Robert McDonald and Tim Boucher, Domesticated 
Nature: Shaping Landscapes and Ecosystems for Human Welfare, SCIENCE, June 29, 2007, at 
1866 (advocating that, because “virtually all of nature is now domesticated,” the task 
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Developing appropriate policies regarding interstate groundwater 
resources is a major challenge. With many interests at stake, not to mention 
resources, legal authorities, and influence, the federal government needs to 
play a key role in the process. 
now is “managing tradeoffs” among the kinds of services ecosystems provide so that 
“nature and people [can] simultaneously thrive”). 
